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Items of historical significance of two wars Iraq and Afghanistan Significant Activity, 
Sigacts, between 0001 January 2004 and 2359 31 December 2009 extracts from CSV 
documents from Department of Defence and CDNE database…This is one of the most 
significant documents of our time removing the fog of war and revealing the true nature 
of 21st century asymmetric warfare…1 
 
This was part of the message sent along with the documents later known as Iraq and Afghanistan 
war logs from Chelsea Manning, a United States solider, to the website of WikiLeaks2-an 
international, online, non-profit organisation which publishes secret and sensitive information. 
The release of the war logs was referred as “the largest leak of classified documents in its 
history3” and the release of diplomatic cables exposed numerous unguarded comments and 
revelations regarding critiques and praises about the host countries of various United States 
embassies; United States intelligence and counterintelligence efforts and other diplomatic 
actions. These leaks put the United States in great controversy considering its actions in the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars and caused quite an embarrassment due to its comments regarding 
diplomatic actions.   
Chelsea Manning was convicted and Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, is facing 
potential criminal prosecution, despite being granted political asylum. While WikiLeaks still 
works as an important role of exposing the “truth” to the public, it imposed great concerns to 
many of the governments around the world towards their government policies, national security 
and general reputation. The consequence of WikiLeaks releasing sensitive information about 
United States government rang the alarm of the importance of governments safeguarding secret 
information.  
The motivation of the United Kingdom government issuing the Justice and Security Act4 
arguably comes from the concern of exposing sensitive information. The Introduction of the Act 
reads that the JSA is “to provide for oversight of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence 
Service, the Government Communications Headquarters and other activities relating to 
intelligence or security matters; to make provision about closed material procedure in relation to 
certain civil proceedings; to prevent the making of certain court orders for the disclosure of 
sensitive information; and for connected purposes”.  
                                                 
1 Denver Nicks Private: Bradley Manning, WikiLeaks, and the Biggest Exposure of Official Secrets in American 
History  (Chicago Review Press, Chicago, 2012) at 137-138.  
2 Wikileaks.org 
3 See <www.bbc.co.uk>, a quote from the United States Department of Defence referring the release of Iraq War 
Logs.  
4 Justice and Security Act 2013 (UK).  
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This Act, based on the objectives mentioned above, introduced closed material procedure to the 
civil proceedings, which is regarded as a response to the judgment of Al Rawi, undoubtedly 
generated huge discussions across boundaries as to the matter of security and liberty; security 
and due process; security and justice; the Act’s in relation to the common law as well as its 
relationship with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.   
While many of the scholars accused JSA of “turning off the light5”, this paper would like to 
direct attention to the Wikileaks incidents and consider the views of both the British government 
and the promoters of human rights and common law. This paper will first introduce the effect of 
CMP in the criminal proceedings, and then look at Al Rawi6 and Tariq7. It will conclude the 
conflicts when adopting CMP and by interpreting JSA to draw some concerns and the certain 
“light”, as well as some suggestions towards CMP in JSA.   
II An Overview-the Use of CMP before Al Rawi  
 
The use of CMP was first adopted in the United Kingdom in the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission Act8, which deals with appeals in cases where the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Home Office) exercises statutory powers to deport, or to exclude, someone from the 
UK on national security grounds, or for other public interest reasons.9  
It has been said that SIAC was passed in response to the European Court of Human Rights’ 
decision in Chahal v United Kingdon, where the appellant, Karamjit Singh Chahal, who was an 
Indian national and Sikh separatist, was also a resident in the United Kingdom. Chahal was 
suspected by the Home Secretary of involvement in terrorist activities. The appellant claimed 
that if he were to be deported from the United Kingdom, as the Home Secretary wished, he 
would be tortured by the authorities in India for his non-violent support for Sikh separatism. One 
of his claims was that although judicial review was available to challenge the Home Secretary’s 
decision in his deportation, the determination of the reason to deport him - his risk to national 
security - was made by an internal Home Office advisory panel, based on sensitive intelligence 
material which there was no opportunity for him to challenge for two reasons: first, the sensitive 
material was precluded from disclosure by public interest immunity; and second, he was not 
entitled to any form of legal representation before the panel.10 
                                                 
5 See for example, Tom Hickman ‘Turning out the lights? The Justice and Security Act 2013′  (11th June 2013) 
UK’s Constitutional Law Blog <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org> .  
6 Al Rawi v The Security Service and others [2011] UKSC 34. [hereinafter Al Rawi].   
7 Home Office v Tariq [2011] UKSC 34. 
8 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK).  
9 See <www.justice.gov.uk>. 
10 House of Commons  Constitutional Affairs  Committee The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals 




The ECHR agreed with the appellant’s complaints and found the Home Office procedure 
breached the appellant’s rights under Article 5(4) of the ECHR. 
 Having been influenced by the similar closed proceedings used in Canada, the Court states that11: 
The Court recognises the use of confidential material may be unavoidable where national 
security is at stake. This does not mean, however, that the national authorities can be free 
from effective control by the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert the national 
security and terrorism are involved…there are techniques which can be employed which 
both accommodate legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of 
intelligence and yet accord the individual a substantial measure of procedure justice.   
 
The “more effective form of judicial control12” approach of Canada, as described and suggested 
by the ECtHR was therefore looked at and borrowed by the United Kingdom, as Section 6 of the 
SICA provided a special advocate system to represent an appellant in cases in which there was 
non-disclosable sensitive evidence in relation to the immigration decisions of the Home 
Secretary. The Government described this as “ the special advocate is necessary to protect the 
public interest in not disclosing the sensitive material, while allowing independent scrutiny of 
that sensitive material by an advocate appointed to represent the interests of the appellant”.13 
Despite the controversy raised by the United Kingdom adopting the special advocate system, and 
the fact that SIAC still deals with cases involving deportation and deprivation of citizenship, the 
use of CMP has been extended to control orders cases under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
200514 and in financial restrictions proceedings under the Counter-Terrorism Act 200815, as well 
as other instruments concerned with the freezing of terrorist assets16.  
Special advocates system before migrated to the United Kingdom, was explained by the ECtHR 
as17: 
 
“a… Judge holds an in camera hearing of all the evidence, at which the applicant is 
provided with a statement summarising, as far as possible, the case against him or hear 
and has the right to be represented and to call evidence. The confidentiality of the 
security material is maintained by requiring such evidence to be examined in the absence 
                                                 
11 Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR at [130]-[131].  
12 Ibid at [144]. Also see David Jenkins “There and Back Again: The Strange Journey of Special Advocated and 
Comparative Law Methodology” (2011) 42 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 279 for the comments of the 
decision by the ECHR in the Chahal case .  Available at <www3.law.columbia.edu>.  
13 Above 10 at 20.  
14 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK). 
15 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (UK).  
16 Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010 (UK). See also Ahmed v H M Treasury [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2WLR 378.  
17 Above n 11 at [141].  
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of both the applicant and his or her reprehensive. However, in these circumstances, their 
place is taken by a security-cleared counsel instructed by the court, who cross-examine 
the witnesses and generally assists the court to test the strength of the State’s case. 
 
In practice, however, the special advocates system adopted in the United Kingdom, despite all 
the vibrant wordings of provisions, does not allow the special advocates to cross-examine 
witnesses or summon witnesses on the appellants’ sides. As Mr Martin Chamberlain, a special 
advocate, pointed out, the special advocates are simply operating on their own with no other’s 
assistance and do their best to test the closed material, but they cannot show it to the appellants 
or their solicitors,18 nor communicate with them.  
This paper will use Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF19, a case under the PTA, to 
draw out the concerns of special advocates system.  
The three appellants, AF, AN and AE, are subject to non-derogating control orders involving 
great restriction of liberty which were made pursuant to Section 2 of the PTA. The issue raised 
by their claims is whether, in each case, the CMP resulted in the making of the control order 
satisfied the appellants’ right of fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR  in conjunction 
with the Human Rights Act 1998.20  
Although it said that it is of course open to “parliament to enact legislation that is incompatible 
with one or more of the Convention rights. The ability to do so is inherent in the constitutional 
role of a sovereign Parliament21”. While Article 6 required a “core irreducible minimum” of 
procedural fairness such that “[t]he controlled person must be given sufficient information about 
the allegations against him to give effective instructions to the special advocate”, the House of 
Lords held by following a decision in A v United Kingdom22, that based on the fact that the 
disclosed material consisted of only general assertions and that the case against the potential 
controlee was based solely or primarily on closed material, the CMP taken by the Home 
Department constituted a breach of article 6 which guaranteed right of fair trial.23  
Even though the law Lords in AF held unanimously that there should be a core irreducible 
minimum and that the controlled person should be given enough information which the 
allegations were made against him/her, the question remained as how to actually measure and 
                                                 
18 Above n 10 at 76.  
19 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and other and one other action [2008] EWCA Civ 1148; 
[2009]UKHL 28 
20 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and other and one other action [2009]UKHL 28at [1].  
21 Ibid at [93].  
22 A and other v United Kingdom Application No 3455/05 [GC], judgment of 19 February 2009. 
23 Above n 2 at [59]. For some discussion between their Lordships in AF see also Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46. See also M Chamberlain “Update on Procedural Fairness in Closed 
Proceedings” (2009) CJQ 448 at 450; Aileen Kavanagh  “ Special Advocates, Control Orders and the Right to a Fair 
Trial” (2010) 73 The Modern Law Review 824. 
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determine the amount of sensitive information that should be disclosed. There can hardly be a 
balance of the amount of sensitive evidence the controlled person seeks to be disclosed and the 
amount of the secret evidence the government actually wants it to be disclosed, let alone how 
much amount of information can be disclosed above the bottom line.   
While the critics of CMP in criminal proceedings have not settled down, two cases that arose 
under the civil procedure drew the public attention to the fact that the United Kingdom was 
trying to extend the use of CMP into civil procedures.  
III CMP in the Civil Proceedings-the Courts’ Practice  
 
Seventeenth century lawyers were fond of quoting the example of Genesis 3.11, in which 
God, though omniscient, said to Adam "Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I 
commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?". In such a case, however, there is no cost in 
compliance with the general rule. God suffered no disadvantage by revealing to Adam 
what he knew. The same is true in most cases in which there is a failure to disclose 
material. But when disclosure is contrary to the public interest, it is necessary to think 
more carefully and ask whether in all the circumstances it would really be unfair not to 
tell the applicant or accused. There may well be cases in which, from the point of view of 
reaching the right decision… If that is the case, the procedure may be fair even though a 




The appellant, Tariq, had worked as an immigration officer since April 2003. His security 
clearance was withdrawn by the Home Office in December 2003, relating to the arrests of his 
brother and cousin, who were alleged in connection with the investigation into the suspected 
terrorist plot to attack multiple trans-Atlantic airline flights in August 2006. Tariq’s brother was 
eventually released without charge while his cousin was convicted of conspiracy to commit 
murder in September 2008. The Home Office’s concern regarding Tariq was that, even though 
there was no information suggesting Tariq himself had any involvement in the terrorist plot, 
given his close connection with the persons who were suspected of involvement, he might be 
vulnerable to outside attempts to have him abuse his position as an immigration officer.25 
In the employment tribunal proceedings, Tariq claimed that withdrawing his security clearance 
constituted discrimination on grounds of race and religion while the Home Office said in their 
                                                 
24 Above n 20 at [72]. See also John Ip “Al Rawi, Tariq, and the Future of Closed Material Procedures and Special 
Advocates” (2012) 75 The Modern Law Review 606. 
25 Ibid at [5].   
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defence that there was no discrimination in this case, that the decisions taken in relation to Tariq 
were taken for the purposes of safeguarding national security, and that the order for a CMP made 
by the Employment Tribunal on the Home Office’s application was made justifiable and for the 
same protective purposes.26 
Unlike Al Rawi, Tariq had specific statutory authorisation - Section 7 of the Employment 
Tribunals Act 1996 confers regulation making power upon the Secretary of State and Section 10  
specifically authorises regulations providing for CMP.27 Moreover, Rule 54 of Schedule 1 of the 
Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulation 2004 provides for the 
use of CMP, while Rule 8 of Schedule 2 provides for the appointment of special advocates. 
Based on the fact that the cross-appeal concerned the compliance of the statutory authorising 
CMP with the ECHR, the appellant argued that the Rule 54 and Rule 8 were contrary to the 
ECHR.28 
Therefore, after the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal dismissed Tariq’s 
challenge to the Employment Tribunal’s order for a CMP29, the issue that was put in front of the 
Supreme Court was not the substantive claim of discrimination but rather it was justifiable for 
the Employment Tribunal to allow a CMP in this case. In other words, the issue was whether the 
English Law was in compliance with the ECHR.  
The House of Lords held that the use of CMP could be justified under ECHR as it was a means 
of necessity. As Lord Hope noted30, 
 
To be effective security vetting will usually, if not invariably, require to be carried out in 
secret. Its methods and the sources of information on which it depends be cannot be 
revealed to the person who is being vetted.  
 
It was recognised that none of the alternatives were satisfactory as CMP, that if CMP was not 
available, the government would either have to conduct proceedings in the ordinary way, in 
which case there would be risk damaging the system of security vetting, or the government 
would have to open itself up to the possibility of unjustified discrimination claims in the future.31 
The court either has to process the case under CMP, or choose not to hear it at all.32 
                                                 
26 Ibid at [2]. 
27 Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (UK). See also above n 7 at [9]-[10] and [74].  
28 Above n 7 at [13]. 
29 The Home Office v Tariq UKEAT 168/09, [2012]ICR 223; [2010]EWCA CIV 462;[2010]ICR 1034.  
30 Above n 7 at [72]. 
31 Ibid at [38] per Lord Mance, [79] per Lord Hope.  
32 Ibid at [39]. 
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The Supreme Court also held33 that the AF principle was inapplicable in this case as the severity 
in these two cases is different. For example, Lord Hope explained that34: 
 
This is an entirely different case from Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF. 
There the fundamental rights of the individual were being severely restricted by the 
actions of the executive. Where issues such as that are at stake, the rule of law required 
that the individual be given sufficient material to enable him to answer the case that is 
made against him by the state. In this case the individual is not faced with criminal 
proceedings against him or with severe restrictions on personal liberty. This is a civil 
claim and the question is whether Mr Tariq is entitled to damages. 
 
It was noted by Lord Kerr in his dissenting opinion that this approach, taken by the majority of 
the Court, would likely lead to a certain degree of uncertainty - for cases where the liberty of the 
subject and ordinary control orders were concerned, the AF principle is applicable, therefore a 
disclosure of secret evidence is needed. Conversely, for cases like Tariq, where the alleged 
damage was not as severe as criminal charges or deprivation of liberty, a disclosure will not be 
required.35 
However, in Al Rawi, another civil claim relevant to CMP, the House of Lords took a different 
approach to examine the use of CMP in the civil proceedings. The difference might be drawn 
from the nature of the two cases-that Tariq was concerned about the compliance of statuary 
authorised CMP with the ECHR, while issues raised in Al Rawi were matter of common law 
legacy as well as the court’s power.  
B Al Rawi 
 
The six claimants36 are individuals who were detained at various locations which include the 
United States detention facility in Guantanamo Bay. The claimants brought their claims together 
in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court, alleging false imprisonment, trespass to the 
person, conspiracy to injure, torture, breach of contract, negligence, misfeasance in public office, 
and breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 of the defendants, the Security Service, the Secret 
Intelligence Service, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office and (in a 
representative capacity) the Attorney General.37 
                                                 
33 Lord Kerr held the dissenting opinion in regards to whether the AF principle should be applied in Tariq.  
34 Above n 7 at [81]. 
35 Ibid at [133]. 
36 Ie Bisher Al Rawi, Jamil El Banna, Richard Belmar, Omar Deghayes, Binyam Mohamed and Marin Mubanga.  
37 Al Rawi and Others v Security Service and Others [2009] EWHC2959 (QB) at [5]. 
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The Government38 filed an open defence in which they admitted that the claimants had been 
transferred and detained, however they denied any liability for the claimants’ detention or 
alleged mistreatment. At a case management hearing, the Government expressed that they were 
in possession of material which they wished the Court to consider, but which they would be 
obliged to withhold from disclosure in the public interest. 
The Government sought to have the trial held under CMP, whereby disclosure would be made by 
the Government not to the claimants and their lawyers, but only to the court and to special 
advocates. To be more specific, the definition of CMP given by the Government is: 
 
A “closed material procedure” means a procedure in which 
(a) A party is permitted to  
(i) Comply with his obligations for disclosure of documents, and 
(ii) Rely on pleadings and/or written evidence and/or oral evidence 
Without disclosing such material to other parties if and to the extent that disclosure to 
them would be contrary to the public interest (such withheld material being known as 
‘closed material’), and 
(b) Disclosure of such closed material is made to special advocates and, where appropriate, 
the court; and 
(c) The court must ensure that such closed material is not disclosed to any other parties or to 
any other person, save where it is satisfied that such disclosure would not be contrary to 
the public interest.  
For the purpose of this definition, disclosure is contrary to the public interest if it is made 
contrary to the interests of national security, the international relations of the United 
Kingdom, the detection and prevention of crime, or in any other circumstances where 
disclosure is likely to harm the public interest.  
 
The claimants argued that the conventional exercise of Public Interest Immunity (PII) 
should be adequate enough to apply in this case, which system had the last major change 
since the decision by the House of Lords in Wiley39. 
Wiley concerned a claim in respect of documents generated by an investigation into a 
claim against the police. The House of Lords overruled the authorities and held that the 
recognition of a new class-based interest immunity required clear and compelling 
                                                 
38 Ie the Defendant in the initial case and the appellants in the subsequent case.  
39 R v Chief Constable of West Midlands, Ex p Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274. 
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evidence that it was necessary and that nothing should prevent a claim being made for 
immunity in respect of sensitive material where appropriate.40 
The basic features of PII, as concluded by the House of Lords in Wiley are: first, it should be 
considered whether the material is relevant to legal proceedings; second, the government must 
consider whether disclosing material would impose harm to public interest; finally, it is up to the 
court to balance whether the public interest in non-disclosure of material outweighs the public 
interest in disclosure of material, if so, then the relevant minister will sign a certificate to that 
effect.41 
Therefore, it is apparent that there are huge differences between CMP and PII. First, under CMP, 
there is no balancing exercise either by the Government or the court to determine whether the 
public interest in withholding evidence outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Rather, it 
relies on the Government to decide what evidence should remain undisclosed, and disclosure of 
such evidence is made to the special advocates - it can be made to the Court, but only when 
appropriate. While, under PII, it is the Court’s decision, based on the practice of weighing the 
justice resulting from disclosing and withholding the evidence, which can be best described by 
Lord Templeman as “a claim to public interest immunity can only be justified if the public 
interest in preserving the confidentiality of the document outweighs the public interest in 
securing justice”42. 
Second, the evidence which is undisclosed under PII is inadmissible - such evidence can no 
longer be relied upon by any party, including the court, as evidence. Closed material, however, is 
still admissible and can be relied on not only by the Government but also by the court.  
At this stage, there was no statuary authorisation of court ordering CMP. Lord Hope in the 
Supreme Court confirmed the view of Court of Appeal-that “it is not open to a court in England 
and Wales, in the absence of statutory power to order a closed material procedure in relation to 
the trial of an ordinary civil claim”43 and that the purpose of a court is to develop common law, 
while introducing CMP to the civil claims of tort would in fact be undermining one of its most 
fundamental principles, namely, the principle of fair trial, which gives the provision that “under 
common law, a trial is conducted on the basis that each party and his lawyer sees and hears all 
the evidence and all the argument seen and heard by the court”44. 
With the concern of substituting PII with CMP, the House of Lords subsequently discussed CMP 
in relation to open justice and natural justice, whether CMP should be a further exception as well 
as whether, it is justifiable for CMP to be a supplementary to PII. 
                                                 
40 Hodge M Malek (ed) Phipson on Evidence (17th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010) at 761.  
41 Above n 26 at 15-16 and also see Adam Tomkins “National Security and the Due Process of Law” (2011) 64 CLP 
1 at 1. 
42 Above n 26 at  280. 
43 Al Rawi and Others v Security Service and Others [2010]EWCA Civ 482 at [11]. 
44 Ibid at [14]. 
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As noted by Lord Dyson, there are certain essential features of a common law trial inherent to 
the system of justice-public justice and natural justice.45 Public justice provides that, subject to 
certain established and limited exceptions, trials should be conducted and judgments given in 
public.46 Natural justice, on the other hand entitles a party to have a right to know the case against 
him and the evidence on which it is based.47 Under natural justice, a party should have the 
opportunity to respond to any such evidence and to submission made by the opposition so it may 
not advance contentions or cite evidence of which it is kept in ignorance.48 Also, the parties 
should be entitled to an opportunity to summon their own witnesses and to cross-examine the 
opposing witnesses.49 
According to Lord Dyson, practicing CMP, without a doubt, contradicts the two principles stated 
above, as exercising CMP can neither enable the parties to have trials open to the public, nor can 
they know the evidence the other side had against them, let alone respond to the evidence, or 
summon their own witnesses or cross-examine the opposing witnesses because all the evidence 
is withheld from the parties under CMP. 
The appellants submitted that in certain circumstances, a CMP was necessary to achieve “real 
justice and a fair trial”.50 As noted by Lord Kerr, there are two essential arguments according to 
the appellants. First, a CMP will be easier to apply than a conventional PII exercise. The 
appellant argued that using CMP in this case can be more efficient than the PII process, as the 
appellant stated that if applying PII in this case, with up to 250000 potential relevant document 
of which up to 140000 may involve considerations of national security – which, if the court 
practices PII procedure, with the employment of 60 lawyers specially for this purpose, would be 
likely to take up to of three years.51 However, this presumption received wide skepticism from 
the law Lords as to whether an argument from expediency alone can justify such a risk of 
changing the conventional rule. 
 The second argument submitted by the appellant is that exercising CMP can result in a fairer 
outcome.52 The appellant argued that CMP can offer an advantage compared to PII, that under 
which the withheld evidence is inadmissible, either a proceeding has to be continued without the 
relevant material, or the case becomes untriable - specifically, under the principle of the fair trial, 
without the disclosed material a fair trial is not possible, thus a trial without the relevant material 
should not proceed.  
                                                 
45 Above n 6 at [10]. 
46 Ibid at [11]. 
47 Ibid at [12] 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid at [8]. 
51 Ibid at [79]. 
52 Ibid at [91]. 
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This claim, according to Lord Kerr, however, is not logical as failing to disclose such relevant 
evidence will result in the difficulty of challenging such withheld evidence from the opposing 
party – as they have no idea what the evidence is. As Lord Kerr observed “evidence which has 
been insulated from challenge may positively mislead”.53 
As to the discussion of using CMP to substitute or as a supplement to PII, four of the judges in 
the majority – Lord Dyson, Lord Hope, Lord Brown and Lord Kerr noted that a common law 
court had no power to order CMP as a substitute or a supplement for PII.54 The three dissenting 
judges – Lord Mance, Lord Clarke and Lady Hale, concluded that there was no power for a court 
to introduce CMP as a substitute for PII, but they believed that a court had the power to order 
CMP as a supplement to PII.55  
In the view of Lord Mance and Lady Hale, a court can order CMP when the undisclosed 
evidence was in the possession of the defendant and the claimant agreed to CMP to avoid his 
claim being untriable due to the lack of sufficient evidence,56 whereas Lord Clarke took another 
view, as he agreed both parties should be able to make submissions as to whether CMP should be 
adopted after the court completes PII procedure. If, a court is persuaded to introduce CMP, then 
adopting CMP in the civil proceedings should be viewed as a development of the common law.57 
The idea of development of common law was, of course, disputed by several judges, as this 
paper introduced above, both the judges in the Court of Appeal and the majority of the judges in 
the Supreme Court agreed on introducing CMP to the civil proceedings may undermine few of 
the fundamental principles, which should be considered as contrary to a common law court’s 
duty and the development of the common law.  
The mediation with the claimants in the Al Rawi case was finally settled outside the court, while 
the confidential nature of the mediation kept the agreement within the relevant parties. While the 
House of Lords were concerned about the role of the court in introducing CMP, the British 
government responded to the reluctance of the court to order CMP by issuing the Justice and 
Security Act. If the application of CMP in Tariq was an attempt to introduce CMP in a civil 
proceeding, then enacting JSA can be regarded as CMP’s official acquaintance with the rules of 
civil proceedings in the common law.  
It should be noted that issuing JSA did not actually answer the questions raised in Al Rawi - that 
is, CMP’s in relation with fair trial. Although it has been said that by Parliament legislating 
provided the least possibility of challenging CMP on the basis on fair trial, it is attempting, still, 
to read JSA and draw out some facts to analyse the government’s attitude towards the Al Rawi 
                                                 
53 Ibid at [93]. This paper will present an argument as opposed to the judges’ finding in the Conclusion.  
54 Ibid at [40]–[49] Lord Dyson, [73] Lord Hope, [81]–[82] Lord Brown and [88] Lord Kerr.   
55 Ibid at [107] and [152].   
56 Ibid at [112]-[121]. 
57 Ibid at [159]-[180]. 
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judgment considering the Wiley balance exercise and court’s discretion, as well as the future role 
of CMP in relation to PII.  
IV CMP in the Civil Proceedings-the Justice and Security Act 
 
Section 6 of JSA gave provisions of declaration permitting CMP in proceedings. Under this 
section, the court seized of relevant civil proceedings may make a declaration that the 
proceedings are procedures where a CMP may be made to the court. To make a declaration, in 
other words, to grant the government the use of CMP, there are two conditions that must be met, 
which include58,  
 
The first condition is that, 
(a)a party to the proceedings would be required to disclose sensitive material in the 
course of the proceedings to another person (whether or not another party to the 
proceedings), or 
(b)a party to the proceedings would be required to make such a disclosure were it not for 
one or more of the following— 
(i)the possibility of a claim for public interest immunity in relation to the material, 
(ii)the fact that there would be no requirement to disclose if the party chose not to rely on 
the material, 
(iii)section 17(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (exclusion for 
intercept material), 
(iv)any other enactment that would prevent the party from disclosing the material but 
would not do so if the proceedings were proceedings in relation to which there was a 
declaration under this section. 
The second condition is that it is in the interests of the fair and effective administration of 
justice in the proceedings to make a declaration. 
 
Section 8 gave more detailed explanation as to determination by court of application in section 6 
proceedings. It explains what CMP requires, specifically that the material cannot be disclosed 
other than to the court, any person appointed as a special advocate, and where the Secretary of 
                                                 
58 Above n 4, Section 6(1) and Section 6 (2).  
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State is not the relevant person but is a party to the proceedings, the Secretary of State.59 The 
closed material is admissible and “the court is required to give permission for material not to be 
disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be damaging to the interests of 
national security”60. A summary of the closed material can be given by the relevant person but 
the court is required to ensure that such a summary does not contain material the disclosure of 
which would be damaging to the interests of national security.61 If the court considers that the 
material or anything that is required to be summarised might adversely affect the relevant 
person’s case or support the case of another party to the proceedings, then it must be authorised 
to direct that the relevant person not to rely on such points in that person’s case, or in any other 
case, the court has to ensure that the relevant person does not rely on the material or on that 
which is required to be summarised.62 
It is interesting to note that, under Section 6 of JSA, the wording of this provision seems to give 
the court space to authorise CMP, provided the two conditions have been met. However, Section 
8 gives specific directions to the court as it is the court’s responsibility to authorise CMP if a 
matter of national security involved. 
Section 6(4)(b)(i) clearly outlines the government’s intend of using CMP to substitute PII in the 
civil proceedings, in the circumstance that the case is in the interests of the fair and effective 
administration of justice. Therefore, this provision can be read as a declaration that the court 
should permit the application of using CMP, even if PII is applicable, however, this authorisation 
must be made in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice. Then, so far, it 
seems the court still has the discretion of determining whether applying CMP in a case can 
satisfy the interests of fair and effective administration of justice. However, the question is how 
to measure these two sometimes opposing factors? 
As the appellant in Al Rawi stated, replacing PII with CMP can achieve efficient administration, 
as the closed material is still admissible in CMP while going through the closed material under 
PII would cost a lot of resources and time. However, as the majority of the law Lords noticed, 
withholding evidence from an effected person is indeed in conflict with natural justice and 
procedure justice. Would a claim of efficiency be sufficient to offset the fairness requirement? It 
is possible for the government to argue that using special advocate system can help to achieve 
the fair administration claim as there would be a third, security-cleared, impartial person to assist 
the relevant person to look at the closed material, but the weakness in this case, is that again 
there are disadvantages in the special advocates system that, even if they use all their effort to 
look at the closed material, afterwards they are not allowed to communicate with the relevant 
party, nor their solicitors, letting alone to cross-examine witnesses or summon witnesses. 
Moreover, this requirement also departed from the government’s justification of applying CMP 
                                                 
59 Ibid, Section 8 (1) (a). 
60 Ibid, Section 8(1)(c). 
61 Ibid, Section 8(1)(d)(e).  
62 Ibid, Section 8(3). 
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in Al rawi, ie the accountability and fairness. However, it is true that if the government required 
the court to authorise CMP on these grounds, which the court would have to examine the 
accountability and fairness first, then it probably will receive the rejection on the grounds the 
Supreme Court has given in Al Rawi. 
Where a declaration is made, Section 8(1)(c) further requires the court to authorise CMP if it 
considers disclosing certain material would be damaging to the interests of national security. 
Based on the wording, the court would still have discretion in deciding whether the disclosure of 
certain material would be damaging to the interests of national security. However, this provision 
would enable the government so easily to use national security as a shield to avoid vetting from 
the relevant party, and the court, as it is such a broad term. Therefore, once a declaration is made 
by the court under Section 6, the court must comply with section 8.  
It is also interesting to put the “core irreducible minimum” principle mentioned in Article 6 of 
ECHR, as well in AF and MB together when reading JSA. It is true that this principle was 
applied previously in the control order cases, however, the question is - is it possible for the court 
to refuse to grant permission of application of using CMP in the civil proceedings based on the 
relevant party must be informed of the allegations against him to give effective instructions to 
the special advocate?  This paper holds the negative view as noted in Tariq, the majority of the 
Supreme Court noted there’s a main difference between this case and AF, which can be 
summarised as AF was a case where the relevant party was put under the criminal proceeding 
and that the liberty were severely endangered or even damaged; while Tariq was a case to 
challenge the English Law’s justification in relation to the European Law and ECHR, and that 
compared to AF,  the individual was not facing criminal proceedings nor his liberty right being 
severely restricted. The Court also noted that in the cases like Tariq, there are actual needs for 
the court to apply CMP.  
While taking another look further at Al Rawi, where the reluctance expressed by the Court was 
mainly the unwillingness of changing the rule of law-which as Lord Dyson noticed that the PII 
process is not perfect, yet it is adequate enough to deal with civil proceedings.63 As noted above, 
under PII the court has discretion to balance the public interest of withholding the evidence and 
disclosing the close material. While according to the rules for the court under JSA, the mere 
discretion for the court are the determination of fair and effective administration of justice, and 
further on the determination of whether disclosing material would damage the national security. 
Where the court does not have the “need” to exercise the Wiley balance, it was suggested that the 
British government was avoiding the possibility of repeat of the Binyam Mohamed64 case. In 
Binyam Mohamed, CMP was used in judicial review proceedings with the consent of the parties, 
while unlike in the statuary contexts in which CMP is used, PII proceeding, including the Wiley 
balance was applied, based on which the Court of Appeal decided to disclose information that 
                                                 
63 Above n 6 at 49. 
64 Binyam Mohamed v Secretary of State [2011] QB 218. 
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revealed the United Kingdom’s officials were much well aware of the mistreatment of Binyam 
Mohamed while he was detained in Pakistan, based on the report supplied to them by the CIA.  
An amendment to JSA that would have introduced the Wiley Balance was defeated in the House 
of Commons, just as it had been in the House of Lords. The reason given by the government was 
that the Wiley balance simply had no relevance in the context of CMP because there is no 
question of damage to the interests of justice by material being excluded from the proceedings 
altogether, which is somehow ironic judged by what happened after the Court decided to disclose 
the secret evidence based on PII in the Binyam Mohammed case.  
However, taking a step back, if without JSA, and the Al Rawi case was not in a conflict with the 
Court’s power in changing the common law, would the House of Lords agree the government’s 
application of using CMP in the civil proceedings? It can be noticed in Tariq that the judgment 
given by the Supreme Court would likely cause uncertainty that judged by the degree of the 
rights of liberty were damaged, it is not likely for the court to apply CMP in the general civil 
case. While in this case, issuing CMP by the statutory power can simply be viewed as a 
clarification by the government to extend CMP to a broader regime.  
As the concerns raised of JSA showed the government’s desire of controlling over its secret 
evidence in the civil proceedings, there are certain points must be drawn out as the “light” of 
practicing CMP in the civil proceedings. 
V Conclusion-Drawing out the “Light”  
 
As Lord Hoffman noted in AF, when deciding whether CMP is applicable, sometimes it is 
essential to look at the subject matter,  ie the secret material, that whether withholding it would 
really affect the interests of the individual. As many scholars and judges have criticised CMP of 
damaging natural justice and open justice, they did not consider one circumstance where the 
secret material is in favour of the individual. That is to say, if exercising PII in the cases where 
the evidence is in support for the individuals, based on the public interest the evidence should be 
disclosed and inadmissible, while under CMP, the evidence can still be seen by the court and 
special advocates and despite being withheld. The court can still be able to rely on such evidence 
to decide potentially in favour of the individual.65 
Also, for cases like Tariq, where as Lord Hope noticed that none of the alternatives were 
satisfactory. In this case, whether he court should proceed under CMP, otherwise the case should 
not be tried at all.  
                                                 
65 Thanks to Franziska Liebelt for contributing this point.  
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Further, the government brought forward an additional power for the court to revoke CMP. As 
Section 7 (2) states,  “the court must keep the declaration under review, and may at any time 
revoke it if it considers that the declaration is no longer in the interests of the fair and effective 
administration of justice in the proceedings”. Therefore, the fair and effective administration of 
justice is the key of the court to trigger CMP, as well as to terminate such a procedure.  
The government also bowed to pressure to insert clauses requiring information about the use of 
CMP to be made public and for a review the operation of the system. For example, Section 12 of 
JSA required the Secretary of State to report on the use of CMP every twelve months, including 
the number of cases where it has been used and on the application of which party.66 Section 13 of 
JSA requires the Secretary of State to appoint a person to review the operation of the provision 
relating to CMP after five years.67 These provisions somehow enhanced a degree of transparency 
in the court operating cases under CMP. 
It was said that when the United Kingdom first borrowed CMP to its own legal system, it was ill 
informed by thinking that operating CMP in the United Kingdom was with international 
approval, as the Court of Al Nashif v Bulgaria noticed, 
 
Without expressing in the present context an opinion on the conformity of the above 
system [the special advocate] with the Convention，the Court notes that, as in the case of 
Chahal cited above,  there are means which can be employed which both accommodate 
legitimate national security concerns and yet accord the individual a substantial measure 
of procedural justice.68  
 
Yet, after the government issuing JSA, the criticism comes from across boundaries based on 
CMP violated procedural fairness as well as ECHR. While the issue is, as noted in AF, it is up to 
the state’s sovereignty power to enact legislation which is incompatible with one or more 
convention rights. It can also be noticed from Tariq that procedural fairness does not seem to be 
a quite persuasive arguing point. Therefore, parliament enacting JSA to introduce CMP into the 
civil proceedings is a now a fixed point. Based on the “light” this paper draw above, and the 
intense situation happed to the United States after WikiLeaks incident, it is somehow 
understandable for the United Kingdom to adopt certain means in order to protect its national 
security as well as its diplomatic relationships with other countries. In relation to the natural 
defect of CMP, this paper would like draw few suggestions: 
                                                 
66 Above n 4 at Section 12. 
67Above n 4 at Section  13.  
68 Al Nashif v Bulgaria  [2002] ECHR 497.  
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First, as can be seen from many of the criticism about CMP is that one flaw of the special 
advocate system, in which the relevant person cannot communicate with the special advocate, or 
give instructions, and that the special advocate works all by itself without any support. It was 
suggested by nine special advocates, 
…the principal requirement for a special advocate in proceedings before SIAC is the 
ability to absorb and analyse information that may be in voluminous documents and to 
cross-examine effectively on the basis of this. Such abilities are not confided to public 
law practitioners. While public law issues do sometimes arise in relation to closed 
material, the nature of the work may also require skills which those such as criminal 
lawyers or those with experience of handling witnesses in civil cases, would be equally if 
not better qualified to perform.69 
 
The Lord Chancellor also accepted criticism about the insufficient number of special advocates 
and stated in favour of the relevant person should ultimately be able to choose the special 
advocate on the list70.  
Second, in response to the provisions of summarising closed evidence under Section 8(3) of JSA, 
this paper suggests that the relevant person should not be forbidden of using the summarisation 
of relevant material or information. Conversely, the relevant person should be granted right to 
use the summarisation so that the individual can be able to make its own proper defence and 
know about the direction the case is leading to, which, is in compliance with procedural justice.  
Given the statutory authorisation of the court applying CMP in the civil proceedings, it should 
also be interesting to see how would  JSA influence the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures regimes. However, it ultimately depends on how would the court interpret JSA and 
decide to use their new statutory jurisdiction to scrutinise the conduct of the British government.  
  
                                                 
69 Above n 10 at 29.  
70 Ibid at 29-30. 
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